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This paper examines the implications of irrigation service charge policies for the poor in 
developing Asian countries. The basic question answered in the paper is ‘Have low irrigation 
service charges disadvantaged the poor?’. The paper also demonstrates the implications of 
alternate structures of water charging for the poor. The empirical evidence presented in the paper 
is mainly based on primary data collected through household level surveys from 5408 households 
in 26 medium and large scale irrigation systems in six countries: Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam. In the studied systems, irrigation charge varies from US$ 1 to 
US$ 67 per ha, and the collection rate varies from 5 percent to 99 percent. In general, irrigation 
charge level and the collection rate is lower in the studied systems in South Asian countries than 
those in China, Indonesia and Vietnam. In settings, where irrigation charge is higher, irrigation 
service delivery and performance of the systems is better, productivity is higher and the poverty 
incidence is low, and vice versa. Overall system performance, and revenue collection and overall 
cost recovery is better in those systems where there are decentralized institutional arrangements 
for irrigation management.  The study suggests that under conditions of low irrigation charges, 
funding for the sector is often low and maintenance of the systems is neglected; there is a lack of 
incentives for service providers and the users to improve on service delivery, and there are no 
incentives for users to improve on water use efficiency, and low charge policy worsens income 
distribution especially in those settings where there is greater degree of inequity in land and water 
distribution (as in most South Asian systems), as large part of benefits of subsidies to irrigation 
sector goes to larger landholders. Further, it is indicated that in relation to irrigation charge 
policy, not only the level of irrigation charge is important, structure of charge, and the collection 
and spending mechanisms and associated institutional arrangements have strong implications for 
the poor. The study suggests that poor service delivery and low irrigation charges create 
vicious circle of poor irrigation performance. These factors reduce poors’s access to water, 
and result in reduced anti-poverty impacts of irrigation. Detailed analysis of data from irrigation 
systems in Pakistan suggests that the present charging policy is pro-large farmers; flat rate policy 
would be more equitable and differential rate policy would be pro-poor.  The analysis indicates 
that differential rate policy, as suggested in the paper, would result in irrigation revenue increases 
by 27.7 percent, and this option would result in annual re-distribution of Rs 1362 million, with 
significant amount redistributed in favor of the poor small farmers – a win-win situation in terms 
of cost recovery and benefits to the poor. Overall, the study findings imply that low level of 
charges applied uniformly to all socio-economic groups of farmers is disadvantageous to the 
poor, as it adversely affects the system performance. The study makes some suggestions on what 
needs to be done to improve the situation.   
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Background 
 
In recent years, there have been discussions in the national and international forums on the role of 
irrigation in poverty alleviation in developing Asia. These have led to considerable works on 
examining the linkages between access to irrigation and poverty alleviation at the household, 
community and macro economy levels (see for example Saleth et al. 2003). Irrigation has been 
regarded as an effective weapon again rural poverty. Hussain and Hanjra (2003, 2004) and 
Hussain and Wijerathne (2004a) provide empirical evidence from a number of developing Asian 
countries on the impacts of irrigation on poverty. In most settings, poverty is 20-30 percent less in 
irrigated areas compared to that in non-irrigated areas (Figure 1). Their studies establish that 
irrigation contributes to poverty a lleviation, and poverty reducing benefits of irrigation are 
realized through improvements in: agricultural productivity and overall production, employment 
and wages, incomes, consumption, food security and other social aspects. These benefits tend to 
be interrelated and tend to reinforce the impacts of each other. With these benefits, irrigation 
water is linked to poverty alleviation both directly and indirectly. Direct impacts are realized 
through improved welfare of those having access to land, water and other production inputs. 
Indirect impacts are realized through expansion in economic activities in both agricultural and 
agricultural dependent non-agricultural sectors through backward and forward linkages, resulting 
in improved economic growth which contributes to poverty alleviation. 
 
Figure 1. Poverty in Irrigated and Non-irrigated Areas in Selected Asian Countries. 

































































































































































Vietnam (1996): Ut, Hossain and Janaiah 2000 (sample was drawn from 8 villages in six districts in four provinces, two each from 
north and south Vietnam, representing four distinct agro-ecosystems  – flood prone areas in Mekong river delta, rainfed low land in 
Southern region, densely settled lowlands in red river delta, and upland in the northern mountainous region) ;  Philippines (1997): 
Hossain, Gascon and Marciano 2000 (sample was drawn from 4 villages, from two provinces in Luzon and one province in Panay 
Island (Laguna, Central Luzon and Iloilo provinces) representing distinct ago-ecosystems); Thailand (1998): Isvilanonda, Ahmed and 
Hossain 2000 (sample was drawn from 6 villages, 3 each from Suphan Buri in central plain and Khon Kaen in the north-east region) ; 
India- Bihar (1996): Thakur et al. 2000 (sample was drawn from 16 villages in 8  districts in four agro-climatic regions of the state)  
India- Chattisgarh (1996): Janaiah, Bose and Agarwal 2000 (sample was drawn from 6 villages in two distinct regions in Raipur 
district); Bangladesh- G.K (Ganges Kobadak) (2002): Ahmad et al. 2003; Bangladesh- Pabna (2002): Ahmad  et al. 2003; India-AP 
(Nagar Juna Sagar, Andhra Pradesh) (2002): Sivimohan et al. 2003; India- AP (Krishnia Delta System, Andhra Pradesh) (2002): 
Sivimohan et al. 2003; Pakistan (Upper Indus Basin) (2001): Hussain et al. 2002 ; Sri Lanka (Udawalawe Left Bank system) (2001), 
Hussain et al. 2002. Indonesia- Yogyakarta (2002): Arif et al. 2003  3 
While there is ample evidence to suggest that irrigation contributes to poverty alleviation, 
however, the anti-poverty impacts of irrigation vary greatly across systems and locations within 
systems. Comparison of poverty across irrigated and rainfed settings, as shown in Figure 1, 
indicates that impact of irrigation on poverty differs across locations. Further, rigorous 
comparative poverty and irrigation impact analyses within irrigation systems by  Hussain and 
Wijerathne (2004, forthcoming) suggest that poverty varies from 6 percent to 77 percent in 26 
irrigation systems in six Asian countries: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and 
Vietnam. These studies suggest that investments in irrigation may not always be poverty reducing 
in any significant way, and the magnitude of anti-poverty impacts of irrigation depends on five 
determining factors. These include: (a) condition of irrigation infrastructure and its management, 
(b) irrigation water allocation and distribution policies, procedures and practices, (c) irrigation 
and production technologies, cropping patterns and crop diversification, and (d) support measures 
(e.g.  information, input and output marketing), and (e) (in) equity in land distribution. These 
studies provide empirical evidence that incidence and severity of poverty is significantly high in 
those settings where land and irrigation water distribution is inequitable, irrigation infrastructure 
is poorly managed, and farmers access to production enhancing technologies, and support 
measures is very limited.  
The first three of the above-mentioned factors directly relate to irrigation service delivery 
and overall irrigation management performance, which are key determinants of availability and 
access to irrigation water. Improved performance (in terms of water use efficiency, productivity, 
equity and sustainability) , which is an outcome of the effective management, improves benefits 
of irrigation and contributes to reducing poverty. On the other hand, poor performance reduces 
the benefits of irrigation and negates the anti-poverty impacts of irrigation or in certain situations 
it creates poverty. Clear evidence is emerging from these recent and on-going studies in Asian 
irrigation systems that irrigation performance has significant relationship with poverty alleviation 
(see Hussain and Wijerathne 2004, forthcoming).  
Poor service delivery in irrigation, an outcome of poor management of irrigation and 
irrigation infrastructure, is the fundamental cause of the poor performance of irrigation. 
Underlying factors leading to poor service delivery and overall poor performance include: (1) 
lack of appropriate and effective institutional arrangements and or their effective implementation 
(including appropriate policies, laws, regulations, and management organizations), including 
clarity in rights and responsibilities, appropriate incentive strictures and effective accountability 
mechanisms, and (2) inadequate funding available and under-spending in the sector – an outcome 
of low cost recovery resulting from low level of irrigation charge, inappropriate charging 
structures and poor collection rates. These factors are interrelated and reinforce the impact of 
each other. Inadequate funding is the root cause of the other factors.  
Traditionally, medium and large scale canal irrigation systems have been managed and 
operated by the public agencies, and the public sector have been providing large amount of 4 
subsidies to rehabilitate, maintain and manage these systems. Revenues collected through water 
charges from users (usually in the form of ‘water tax’) constituted only a small part of total 
available funding and spending due to low level of irrigation charges and poor collection rates. 
While there is growing pressure (both internal and external) to reduce subsidies to the sector, in 
most situations the sector continues to depend on financial allocations from the public sector. The 
fundamental reason for continuing financial dependence of irrigation sector on budgetary 
allocations from the public agencies sector and the lack of financial autonomy of the sector is 
continued low irrigation service charge policy and lack of effective institutional arrangements. 
Low level of irrigation charges are often justified on account of the following four concerns:  
 
(a)  affordability and willingness to pay, due to relatively higher incidence of poverty and 
food insecurity, it is often assumed that most small and poor farmers cannot afford to pay 
(and may not be willing to pay) for irrigation, therefore, charges should be set at low 
levels,  
 
(b)  political sensitivity, raising water charges is generally considered to be politically 
difficult,  
 
(c)  positive externalities of irrigation impacts, given that benefits of irrigation extend to 
society as a whole, therefore, consumers (in addition to producers) of agricultural 
produce should also contribute or in other words, sector should continue receiving public 
sector subsidies, and  
 
(d)  public good nature of irrigation water, irrigation water is continued to be viewed as 
public good, implying that the public sector role, including financing of the sector, should 
continue .  
 
These concerns continue to dominate perceptions of those who support low irrigation charges. On 
the other hand, some argue for higher irrigation charges and for financial independence of the 
sector. The supporters of higher charges sometime argue that low charges may in fact be 
disadvantageous to the poor. There are arguments and counter arguments on the issue, and there 
is no consensus on whether irrigation charges should be kept low or increased to the reasonable 
level to cover full or part of O&M and service delivery costs. This paper, based on empirical 
evidence from a number of irrigation systems in six countries, attempts to clarify on some of 




Purpose and the Basic Proposition 
 
In the context of above discussion, this paper attempts to examine the implications of irrigation 
service charge policies for the poor, covering its three major aspects: level of irrigation charges, 
structure of irrigation charges (in terms of differentiation in charges between seasons, crop types, 
farm size, etc), and charge collection and spending mechanisms. The fundamental question 
answered here is ‘Have low irrigation service charges disadvantaged the poor?’. The paper also 
demonstrates the implications of alternate structures of water charges for the poor.  
The following points summarize the major grounds and the basic theoretical reasons 
often put forward on why and how low charge policy adversely affects irrigation performance and 
service delivery and how it could be disadvantageous to the poor. Low irrigation service charges 
leads to:  
 
a)  Inadequate funding and neglect of maintenance:  Revenues and funds available for 
irrigation management are low, and the sector have to depend on financial allocations 
from the public sector which are often inadequate to carry our necessary operations, 
maintenance and management. Consequently  maintenance is neglected, infrastructure 
condition deteriorates, overall availability and access to water is reduced;  
 
b)  Lack of Incentives to improve on service delivery: M anagers and service providers, 
receiving large part of funds from central agencies/treasury, have little or no incentives to 
spend funds efficiently, and deliver high quality services; users paying low charges feel 
they have little entitlement, and there are little incentives for them to demand for 
improvements in service delivery; and accountability linkages in terms of spending and 
service delivery between managers, service providers and users remain weak. As a result, 
irrigation service delivery continues to be poor and system performance in terms of water 
use efficiency and productivity remains low. Poor irrigation performance reduces access 
to water, particularly of the poor, with adverse impacts on their livelihoods. In other 
words, poor service delivery and low irrigation charge create vicious circle of poor 
irrigation performance, and reduces anti-poverty impacts of irrigation (see World Bank 
(1999), Hussain and Biltonen, 2002 for details)     
 
c)  Lack of incentives to use water efficiently: When irrigation charges are low, there are no 
incentives for users to use water efficiently and avoid wasteful use of water, resulting in 
reduced overall availability and access to water. When access to water is free or at very 
little cost to the users, non-poor, the powerful and those having locational advantage tend 
to grab more than their due share (especially in settings  where rights are not clearly 
defined and enforced), not only they use it in unsustainable manner, they deprive others, 6 
particularly the poor and the weaker. On the contrary, where water charges are high, 
farmers use water carefully and benefit from each drop of water. For example, in most 
Chinese systems, as will be shown in the paper, irrigation charge is fairly high, water is 
used relatively effectively and the productivity per drop of water is also very high.  
 
d)  Low charge policy worsens income disparity: In settings where there is greater inequity 
in distribution of land and water (as in most South Asian systems), low charge policy 
applied uniformly to all socio-economic groups worsens income and resource disparity 
between the poor and the non-poor as large part of the benefits of subsidise to the sector 
goes to large landholders. 
 
e)  Other aspects: Low charge policy and financial dependence on public sector agencies 
may also affect collection and spending efficiencies. It should be noted that, for irrigation 
service charge policy, not only the level of irrigation charge is important, the structure of 
charge, and the collection and spending mechanisms and associated institutional 
arrangements are also equally important in terms of implications for the poor. 
 
In the next sections, we examine whether some of the reasons are supported with data. 
Empirical evidence presented in this paper is mainly based on primary data, supplemented with 
data from secondary sources. Primary data were collected through household level surveys, 
during 2001-2002 agricultural year, from 5408 households in 26 medium and large irrigation 
systems in six countries: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam. These are 
among the top few countries where substantial investments have been made in the development 
of large and medium scale canal irrigation systems, where irrigated agriculture provides 
livelihoods to hundreds of millions of rural people. These countries together account for over 51 
percent of global net irrigated area and over 73 percent of net irrigated areas in Asia, with most of 
this area located in China, India and Pakistan. The selected irrigation systems vary in terms of 
size, canal water supplies, groundwater use, condition of irrigation infrastructure, irrigation 
management patterns, crop productivity, level of crop diversification, land quality and size of 
landholdings (for more details on locations and characteristics of the selected systems and for 
data collection procedures, see Hussain and Wijerathne 2004b) 7 
Key Points from the Past Work 
 
To the best of author’s knowledge, there are no studies examining the linkages between low 
irrigation charge and poverty and offering detailed analyses of the implication of low charge 
policy for the poor. However, there is a vast amount of literature available on general issues 
related water charging and pricing. No attempt is made here to review the available literature, but 
rater key points and main conclusions from some the recent related studies are summarized here. 
Readers interested in more elaborative discussions may refer to Tsur and Dinar (1995), and 
Hussain and Wijerathne (2004, forthcoming) and for comprehensive review of the past work on 
water charging and pricing issues may refer to Johansson (2000) and Johansson et al. (2002). 
 
1.  Small et al. (1989) in their review of literature and case studies in Indonesia, Nepal, 
Philippines and India conclude that: a). providing appropriate incentives to agencies 
responsible is important for cost e ffective management of irrigation. Financially 
autonomous agencies, raising their revenues from farmers’ payments of irrigation service 
fees have greater incentive to provide good irrigation service compared to financially 
dependent agencies that receive t heir revenues from the national treasury. Also, 
decentralized financial autonomy creates financial accountability linkages between 
irrigation managers and users; b). most financing mechanisms used in the case study 
countries did not provide incentives for efficient use of water. The main direct financing 
method involved irrigation service fee charged based on flat rate per unit of area, 
sometime differentiated for crop type and cropping intensity. The area based fees, rather 
than promoting efficient water use, generally provide incentives for overuse of water by 
those farmers able to obtain it. Efficiency of water use is related to effectiveness of 
agencies’ control over distribution of supply to farmers, rather than the control over the 
demand for water through pricing mechanisms; c) under conditions of reasonable 
irrigation service fee, the incremental benefits derived by farmers from irrigation are 
adequate for them to pay the full O&M cost while retaining significant increase in net 
incomes due to irrigation.  d) the quality of irrigation system operation and management 
is affected not only by the amount of resources made available to operate and maintain 
systems, but by the institutional arrangements under which they are provided. 
 
2.  The Expert Consultation on Irrigation Water Charges (ECIWC 1986) states, (as reported 
in  Bos and Walters 1990  that) “ Water charges policies are unlikely to have any 
significant impact on the efficiency with which individual farmers use water except in 
those extreme cases where at the same time: water is scarce, the irrigation systems deliver 
water on demand basis (response to ad hoc requests), and water deliveries are measured” 
Further, even if charges are levied on volumetric basis and farmers can control the 8 
quantity of water delivered, low charges will not have any significant influence on 
efficiency.  
 
3.  Bos and Walters, 1990 in their global survey of farmers (covering 8.9 million ha 
globally) examined the relationships between irrigation charges and irrigation 
efficiencies. They conclude that: a) no significant influence of the structure of water 
charges on irrigation efficiencies, and efficiencies were not high where charges were 
levied by volume, because charges were too low to have significant impact (charges in 
almost all projects were under 10 percent of net farm income); and b) irrespective of the 
structure of water charges, there was a trend towards higher efficiencies with higher 
charges;  
 
4.  Perry (2001) argues that lower water rates will have no impact on demand, and higher 
rates that will influence demand will be too high to be politically acceptable and will 
result in substantial profits to supplying agency. For example, the likely charge needed to 
cover O&M costs would be $0.003-0.005 per m
3, while the charge required  to 
substantially affect demand would be much higher $0.02-0.05 per m
3. Therefore, a charge 
designed to recover O&M costs will have minimal efficiency impacts, and charge that 
will affect efficiency will be too high to be politically feasible. He suggests that: (1) many 
of the assumed advantages of water pricing can be achieved through physical rationing of 
water, which is easier to implement, more transparent and more readily adjusted to local 
considerations such as groundwater conditions and salt management; and (2) set water 
charges to recover full O&M costs to ensure financial sustainability of irrigation systems. 
The study does not provide any analysis of equity implications of recovering full O&M 
costs.     
 
As mentioned earlier, empirical studies on equity dimensions of water pricing/charging
3 
are rare. In the available literature, there have been arguments for and against water 
                                                 
3In the literature on natural resources, particularly water resources, terms water price, water charge, water fee and water 
tax are often (incorrectly) used interchangeably. In a strict sense, price is a value of a commodity determined by market 
forces. It is a payment for a commodity or service of business character and the individual can escape the price by not 
purchasing the commodity or service. On the other hand, fee and charge (which mean to the same thing) are 
compulsory contributions or payments made by a person to cover a part or all of the expenses involved in some action 
or provision of service by the public authority which while creating a common benefit, also renders a specific benefit or 
service to a person. Fee and charge is intended to cover a part or all of the cost of the service rendered and is never 
more than the cost of the service. Tax is a general compulsory payment levied upon persons to cover the expenses 
incurred in conferring common benefits upon users of a commodity or service. It is a compulsory levy and is meant for 
general purpose of state revenue raising. An individual cannot expect any specific service rendered to him by state in 
return for the tax paid by him. Broadly speaking, price is for goods of pure private nature, charge or fee are generally 
for goods with both public and private characteristics, and tax is for goods of pure public nature. More appropriate term 
for irrigation service may be fee or charge rather than price or tax (for details see Hussain and Wijerathne, 2004b, 
forthcoming)    
 9 
pricing/charging in relation to equity. For example, sometime it is argued that consumers benefit 
from agricultural investments through lower food prices and so should be expected to share in 
covering the costs (Sampath 1992). Some even argue against water charges of any kind in less 
developed countries, as higher income farmers often do not pay (Easter and Welsch 1986). On the 
other hand, it has also been suggested that water charging/pricing may be used as effective means 
to re-distribute incomes especially where there are equity concerns among heterogeneous water 
users and sectors, and that water charging/pricing may play a role in influencing income 
distribution between irrigation districts (Brill, Hochman and Zilberman 1997) as well as between 




Irrigation Charging in Developing Asia – The Context 
 
In this section, we discuss irrigation charging systems presently in practice based on data and 
information collected from 26 irrigation systems in Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam 
and Pakistan. Systems studied in the South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) are 
characterized by high degree of inequity in land and water distribution, with highest inequity in 
Pakistan. For example, in Pakistan 75 percent of sample households owned around 40 percent of 
land, and 25 percent owned 60 percent of land. Average Gini coefficient for land across selected 
systems in Pakistan varied from 0.31 to 0.56, with average value estimated at 0.49. While average 
per household landholding size in Bangladesh is relatively small, its distribution is fairly 
inequitable. For example, in Ganges-Kobadak system, lower 71 percent of sample households 
owned 25 percent of land, middle 27 percent owned 32 percent of land, and large 2 percent 
owned 43 percent of total land area. Similarly, in Indonesian systems, though average land size 
per household is much smaller, there is an element of inequity in its distribution. On the other 
hand, land distribution in Chinese and Vietnamese systems is fairly equitable (basically reflecting 
equitable land policy followed in these countries, for details see Hussain and Wijerathne, 2004a, 
forthcoming), though average land size per household is much smaller than that in South Asian 
countries. Agricultural productivity per ha is the highest in the Chinese systems and the lowest in 
Pakistani systems.  
In all the systems studied, except those which have been transferred or where irrigation is 
managed in more participatory mode (where in most cases water charges are jointly determined 
and assessed by the agency and WUAs), water charges are set administratively by the central or 
provincial/state governments. Irrigation charges are set at low levels, which reflect neither the 
cost of supplying water nor the value/benefits derived from water use. Present level of irrigation 
charges, particularly in the South Asian systems, are too low to have any influence on farmers 
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cropping decisions or water use efficiency. In these systems, water charges are not linked to the 
level of service, charges are levied irrespective of the amount of irrigation water received, and 
irrespective of the quality and reliability of irrigation supplies. In all the agency managed 
systems, water charging, collection and spending is highly centralized. In these systems, revenues 
generated through water charges do not even cover the required O&M cost of the systems, and 
have to depend on public sector subsidies. In those systems, where landholdings are inequitably 
distributed, as in the South Asian systems, large part of benefits of subsidies to the irrigation 
sector goes to large landholders. In the transferred systems or where there are decentralized 
institutional arrangements for irrigation management and service delivery, charge collection and 
spending mechanisms are decentralized and overall performance is better than that of agency 
managed systems. 
In the studied systems in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, irrigation charging system is 
fairly similar. The level and structure of irrigation charges is determined by the state/provincial 
governments. Irrigation charges at the farm level are levied based on area cultivated/cropped, 
crop type, crop condition, and season (Rabi/Kharif). In each season, irrigation charge assessment 
at the filed level is undertaken by irrigation/revenue department officials. Even in most of the 
transferred systems (in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Hakra-4 in Pakistani Punjab) irrigation 
charges are determined by public authorities while assessment and collection is either jointly 
undertaken by government officials and WUAs or in some cases by WUAs (as in Hakra-4 R). 
Within  a state or province, irrigation charges are levied uniformly across canal commands, 
irrespective of the amount of water delivered to a canal command. For example, in Lalian and 
Khadir systems in Punjab, Pakistan, average amount of canal water applied per ha for wheat 
during rabi season is 1458 m
3, and 465m
3 , respectively, (with significant head to tail variations), 
however, seasonal crop water charge is uniform in both systems. Groundwater contributes 55 
percent and 89 percent of total water applied per ha, in the above two systems, respectively (see 
Hussain et al. 2003), and those who supplement canal water with groundwater are fully liable for 
canal water charges. Variations in canal water allocations are not clearly reflected in the charging 
structure. At present, irrigation charges are remitted to the government and there is no direct link 
between funds collected and funds spent on operations and maintenance. Overall irrigation 
charges are low, both because of low level of charge or poor collection rate, and the governments 
in these countries provide subsidies. 
In Indonesia, multiple criteria are used in determining irrigation charges at the tertiary 
level including cropped/irrigated area, crop type, crop productivity, location, level of service and 
users’ capacity to pay, especially in transferred systems (with more decentralized institutional 
arrangements), Variations in canal water allocations are implicitly accounted for in charging 
systems. Farmers using more water by irrigating more area or by growing water intensive crops 
or achieving higher productivity pay more, introducing an element of equity in irrigation charging 
systems. Additional criterion of farmers’ capacity to pay introduces poverty concerns into the 11 
charging system, with the poor farmers paying relatively less than the non-poor farmers. Under 
multiple criteria based charging system (as in the transferred systems) structure of charging is 
such that charges are linked to water supplied/used, and it accounts for poverty concerns. The key 
issue for cost recovery in these systems is the level of irrigation charges. 
In the Chinese and Vietnamese systems studied, irrigation charges are directly or 
indirectly linked to the irrigation service, and water supplied/used. In the studied systems in 
Vietnam, irrigation is charged based on the level of output produced, charges vary across 
systems, and are differentiated by the level of service, that is, households receiving partial 
irrigation service pay less, IDMCs and cooperative sign water delivery and water fee contracts, 
and charging and spending is partially decentralized. In the Chinese systems, level and structure 
of irrigation charges is determined by the local water resources bureaus under the guidelines from 
the provincial governments. At the field level, irrigation charge is based on area irrigated and in 
some cases time period to irrigate the fields. Irrigation charge appears to be related to the cost of 
O&M and overall cost of supplying water. Under these systems, irrigation charges, regardless of 
whether based on size of landholdings or cropping intensities, tends to be relatively equitable. In 
these systems, what is important for cost recovery is the level of irrigation charges. 
As shown in Table 1, in the south Asian systems studied, the level of irrigation charge 
varies from US$4.6/ha to US$22/ha. While the charge level is the highest in Bangladeshi 
systems, collection rate is very low (5-15 percent). Irrigation charges in the Indian systems have 
recently been increased to US$ 10/ha (which constitute 1.6 to 4.3 percent of gross value of 
product), with collection rate varying significantly across systems from 21 percent to 81 percent. 
In Pakistani systems, irrigation charges vary from US$4.6/ha to US$10.6/ha (constituting 1.7 to 
3.9 percent of gross value of product), and overall collection rate is higher (80-99 percent) than 
that in Bangladeshi and Indian systems. In Indonesia, water charges vary from US$1/ha to 
US$20/ha, and collection rate is fairly high, especially in the transferred systems. On the other 
hand, irrigation charges in China and Vietnam are much higher than those in Indonesia and South 
Asian systems. In China, irrigation charges vary from US$26 to US$67/ha (1.8 to 5.2 percent of 
gross value of product), with average collection rate of 80 percent. Similarly in Vietnam, where 
irrigation is charged based on crop output, the charge level is fairly high at US$58 to US$61/ha, 
(constituting 4.6 and 6.3 percent of gross value of product), and overall collection rate is also high 




Irrigation Charge, Irrigation Performance and Poverty 
 
The basic premise here is that when irrigation charges are low, maintenance of irrigation systems 
is neglected, infrastructure is not properly managed, performance of the systems is adversely 
affected, availability and access to water is reduced especially at the tailends, and the poor are 12 
affected the most. However, the magnitude of adverse impacts on the poor varies depending on 
the distribution structure of land and water resources. In those settings, where there is relatively 
greater inequity in land and water (as in south Asian systems described above), low irrigation 
charges and lower than required operation and maintenance (O&M) of the systems and the 
resulting poor performance of the systems affect the poor and the weaker more than the non-poor 
and the powerful. Under these settings, not only the level of irrigation charges is important, the 
structure of irrigation charges has strong implications for the poor, as will be shown in the next 
section.   
As shown in  Figure 2 , in those systems where irrigation charges are low, overall 
performance of the systems in terms of water use efficiency and productivity per ha is low. For 
example, water use efficiency (defined as the ratio of crop water requirements and total inflow 
into the canal system) in Pakistan systems vary from as low as 28 percent to 71 percent. As 
shown in Figure 2, crop productivity in these systems is low. In general, in the low performing 
systems where agricultural productivity is low, the incidence of poverty is high. On the other 
hand, where systems are well managed and overall performance is high, the incidence of poverty 
is also very low. Of course, poverty is the outcome of many complex factors. Agricultural 
productivity is one of the key determinants of poverty, and this is particularly so in those settings 
where households and communities depend for their livelihoods on agriculture. Low level of 
irrigation charges, leading to overall poor system performance, reduces the anti-poverty impacts 
of irrigation. 
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Table 1. Salient Features and Water Charging in Selected Irrigation Systems. 


















Bangladesh  G-K 
South-western 
Bangladesh  Agency 
448 
CG  20  4.46  5-15 
  Pabna 
West-central 
Bangladesh  Agency 
293 
CG  22  7.51  9 
India  NSLC 
Andhra 
Pradesh/Krishnia River- 
Upstream  Transferred 
524 
SG  10  1.91  40-50 
  KDS 
Andhra 
Pradesh/Krishnia River- 
Downstream  Transferred 
637 
SG  10  1.57  82 
  Halali  Madhya Pradesh  Transferred 
323 
SG  10  3.09  33 
  Harsi  Madhya Pradesh  Transferred 
231 
SG  10  4.33  21 
Pakistan  9-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  230  PG 
4.6  2.94  99 
  10-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  360  PG 
6.9)  2.09  99 
  13-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  500  PG 
10.6  2.06  80 
  14-R  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  430  PG 
8.8  2.41  80 
  Kakowal  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  282  PG 
9.3  3.51  80 
  Phalia  Upper Jehlum Canal 
Agency  413  PG 
8.8  2.31  80 
  Lalian  Lower Jehlum Canal 
Agency  404  PG 
5.6  2.84  87 
  Khadir  Lower Jehlum Canal 
Agency  276  PG 
6.9  3.90  87 
  Khikhi  Lower Chenab Canal 
Agency  481  PG 
7.9  1.66  94 
  Hakra-4  Hakra System  Transferred 
362 
PG  4.6  1.72  91 






1319  PG 
67  5.08  80 






1141  PG 
59  5.17  80 
  PID-HP 
Henan Province- 




1444  PG 
34  2.35  80 
  LID-HP 
Henan Province- 




1417  PG 
26  1.83  80 





PPC  58*  4.6  85-95 





PPC  61*  6.3  99 
Indonesia  Klambu Kiri  Central Java  Agency  729  WUAs  6-11  0.8 to 1  - 
  Glapan  Central Java  Agency 
665 
WUAs  4-16  0.8 to 4.3  - 
  Kalibawang  Yogyakarta  Transferred 
749 
WUAs  13-20  0.6 to 2.2  95 
  Krogowanan  Central Java  Transferred  851  WUAs  1-7  0.2 to 0.6  - 
Notes: IDMCs: Irrigation and Drainage Management Companies.  
G-K = Ganges Kobadak; NSLC = Nagarjuna Sagar Left Bank Canal; KDS = Krishna Delta Systems; WID-NP =  Weining Irrigation District in Ningxia province; QID-NP = Qingtongxia 
irrigation district in Ningxia Province; PID-HP = People’s Victory Irrigation District in Henan province; LID-HP = Liuyuankou Irrigation District in Henan province. CG = Central 
Government, SG = State Government, PG =Provincial Government, WUA= ,Water User Association, PPC =Province People’s Committee; * these figures are based on cost of full 
irrigation (fee for partial irrigation is lower). Average rice yield per ha (for both spring and summer crops) for Nam Duang (ND) and Nam Thach Han (NTH) systems are 8766 kg and 
9241 kg, and average fee for full irrigation for ND is 209kg/ha for spring and 194kg/ha for summer (total 404 kg/year), and for NTH average fee for full irrigation is 290 kg/ha per season 14 
(total 580 kg/ha/year). Estimated average local price for paddy is VD2270/kg for ND and VD1672/kg for NTH systems. Using these values, average annual fee per ha is VD917135 for 
ND and VD969700 for NTH. 
 
 













































































































































































































































GVP ($/ha)  HC (%) Irrigation Charge (US$/ha)
 
 
Similar picture emerges when performance is analyzed in terms of water use efficiency. 
Figure 3 compares conveyance efficiency across improved and un-improved irrigation 
infrastructure/ water courses in the studied systems in Pakistan. Infrastructure was improved to 
increase conveyance and overall water use efficiency. However, as a result of neglect of proper 
maintenance, the performance of infrastructure has deteriorated overtime. In most cases, there are 
no significant differences in conveyance losses across improved and un-improved watercourses. 
Lack of the required funds, and the neglected maintenance are the main causes of this outcome. 
What this implies is that new investments in improving irrigation infrastructure may be 
ineffective in the absence of regular maintenance, that may result from paucity of the required 
funds.  15 
 


















Ill-managed irrigation infrastructure and profligate use of water not only reduces overall 
water availability and its access to farmers, it leads to problems of land degradation such as 
salinity and waterlogging. In Pakistan, for example, the estimates indicate that 20 to 24 percent of 
irrigated land (3.4 to 4.4 million ha) are affected from these problems. Productivity reduction 
impacts of these problems vary from 25 percent to 60 percent. Similar estimates for India range 
from 5.5 million to 13 million ha. In Uttar Pradesh, a 50 percent decline has been reported in crop 
yields over eight years due to salinization and water logging (Joshi and Jha 1991). 
Who suffers the most from this situation? — those who are not influential, those who are 
socio-economically weaker, and those who have locational disadvantage – the poor. Lalian 
distributary in Punjab, Pakistan, is typical case of distributaries in Pakistan, where these is a 
significant upstream-downstream inequity in water distribution, infrastructure is deteriorating, 
and performance is poor in several parts of the system, especially at the tailends. Available 
evidence (Table 2) shows that access to canal water at the tailends is the least, crop productivity is 
low and poverty is relatively high. Poor system performance and institutional deficiencies are 
among the main causes of these problems. Poverty situation at the tailends worsens especially in 
those systems or parts of the systems where there is no alternate source of good quality irrigation 
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Table 2. Upstream-downstream inequity in water, crop productivity and intensity of poverty 
(Lalian distributary, Punjab, Pakistan). 
 
Item/location  Head  Middle  Tail 
Access to canal Water 
(m
3/ha) 
1500  2745  345 
Access to total water 
(m
3/ha) 
3345  4049  2491 
Productivity (wheat  - 
kg/ha) 
4946  3917  3188 
Poverty gap (%)  41  39  44 
Source: Based on primary data 2001-2002. 
 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that the poorly managed infrastructure and 
poor service delivery adversely impacts overall irrigation performance, reduces poors’  access to 
water, resulting in overall lower productivity – all resulting in adverse impacts on the incomes, 
employment and overall livelihoods of the poor.  
 
 
Irrigation Charging Policy and the Poor Small Farmers – Evidence from Pakistan 
   
Now we provide an empirical evidence on the implications of the present irrigation charging 
policy (which is characterized by the low level of charge and biased charging structure) for 
various landholding categories and for the poor and non-poor farmers from Pakistan, where 
inequity in land distribution is the highest in the Asian region (Hussain, 2003). As mentioned 
earlier, irrigation water allocation/distribution in Pakistani systems is based on land size and 
irrigation charges are levied based on cropping intensity. Under warabandi system, all farmers in 
a particular location are entitled for equal allocation of water per ha of land, regardless of the land 
size.  As shown in Table 3, average cropping intensity varies significantly across farm size 
categories, with highest cropping intensity of 181 percent on smallest farm size category and 
lowest cropping intensity of 115 percent on largest farm size category. There are  only marginal 
differences in average cropping intensities across the poor and non-poor farmer groups in 
aggregate terms. However, disaggregated analysis shows that average cropping intensities for the 
poor small farmers are relatively less that for the non-poor small farmers.  
Average annual irrigation charge per ha (area weighted) is Rs. 420/ha. Average per ha 
irrigation  charge is inversely related to land size categories; landholders between 1 to 5 ha paying 
significantly more than the overall average , and those with greater than 10 ha paying less than 
the overall average. This is basically due to differences in cropping intensities, which are higher 
on smaller size farms due to greater use of labor and groundwater. As shown in column 4 of 
Table 3, average groundwater cost per ha is inversely related to farm size categories, smaller size 
farms using more groundwater and incurring higher costs and vice versa. Since under the present 
charging systems, crop area that is partially irrigated with canal water and partially with 17 
groundwater, is fully liable for canal water charges, small farmers are penalized for making 
relatively greater use of groundwater. On average, poor farmers incur Rs. 56 more in total per ha 
cost of irrigation than the non-poor, due to greater use of groundwater and resulting higher overall 
cost (as will be shown, groundwater is around 9 times expensive than the canal water). Overall, 
cropping intensity based irrigation charging is pro-large landholders, and anti-small farmers and 
the poor who make greater use of groundwater to increase their cropping intensities.  
Overall level of canal water charges remains low (this is despite recent increases in the 
level of charges), constituting only 2.5 percent of GVP. Due to less access to canal water, poor 
small farmers incur significantly higher cost per ha due to greater use of groundwater, which is 
around 9 times more expensive than the canal water. Average groundwater cost per ha constitute 
over 20 percent of GVP (compared to only 2.5 percent for canal water), and groundwater cost as 
a proportion of GVP decreases with increase in size of landholdings. The above analysis suggests 
that the major beneficiaries of the present charging system, both the level and the structure of 
charging (and of implicit subsidies to the irrigation sector) are large landholders and the non-poor 
farmers. 
 
Table 3. Cropping Intensity, Water Charges for canal Water and Groundwater, and GVP 
 by landholding size and for Poor and Non-poor Farmers. 









































< 1 ha  181  440  4555  4995  19262  3.32  30.1  10.35 
1.1 to <3 ha  156  439  4038  4477  21552  2.63  22.0  9.21 
3.1 to <5 ha  148  432  3549  3980  22156  2.41  17.9  8.22 
5.1to < 10  ha  133  385  3209  3594  22198  2.25  16.5  8.34 
10 ha and above  115  367  2779  3146  25013  2.18  15.3  7.58 
All  148  420  3707  4127  21909  2.53  20.2  8.83 
Poor  145  404  3748  4152  19802  2.63  22.1  9.28 
Non-Poor   152  439  3657  4096  24485  2.41  17.8  8.33 
Source:  
Based on filed level primary data (2001-2002) collected from a sample of 1224 households in 10 distributaries in Punjab, Pakistan. 
Notes:  
1. Farm cropping intensity is calculated as: (cropped area of farmj /total cultivated area of farmj) 
2. Annual canal water charge per hectare is calculated as :sum(crop area of cropi on farmj*charge for cropi on farmj)/total cropped area                                                                    
of farmj.) 
3. GVP is gross value of product per hectare calculated as: sum (crop area of cropi on farmj*Yield of cropi on farmj *Price of cropi on 
farmj) /total cropped area of farmj.) 
4. Poor are defined as those whose income is below the national poverty line of Rupees 730/capita per month.  
 
Average land size of the poor and the non-poor is 2 ha and 5 ha, respectively. In general, there is a significant inverse relationship 
between poverty and land size i.e. majority of the poor are those who own and operate small landholdings.  
 
It is clear from the above discussion that the present policy of low irrigation charge and 
biased charging structure favors the large landholders and the non-poor farmers. What are the 18 
implications of the figures reported in Table 3 for all the poor marginal and small farmers at the 
province and the country level. Let us look at three policy scenarios, and their implications: 
 
Scenario – 1:   Present policy  – no change in the structure and level of irrigation charges, 
charges are based on cropped areas and cropping intensities; 
Scenario – 2:  Flat rate policy  – flat rate per unit of irrigated land based on land size, 
independent of crop type and cropping intensities, present average irrigation 
charge applied uniformly across all farm size categories; and  
Scenario – 3:   Differential rate policy – differential rate per unit of irrigated land based on land 
size, applied differentially across various farm size categories – progressive rate 
structure (similar to increasing block rate charging). Lower irrigation charge for 
the first two hectares, applied uniformly to all land size categories, and charge 
increases progressively with increase in size of holdings above 2 hectares, by Rs. 
50 per ha for each successive category of land size,  as shown in the following 
equations:      
 
At the province level, under the present charging policy, small farmers in Punjab pay 
more than large farmers in proportion to the share of each group in total landholdings. That is, 
small farmers contribute more to total revenues in proportion to their share in total land (Table 4). 
The present policy clearly disfavors the poor marginal and small farmers. At the province level, 
option – 2 (flat rate charge at present level of average water rate) would result in annual gains for 
small farmers through reduced costs by Rs. 74.45 million, and cost to larger farmers would 
increase by Rs. 326.77 million, and total revenues will increase by 5.3 percent. Policy option -2 is 
better option than policy option  -1 in terms of equity and revenues. Under policy option – 3, 
smaller farmers, as a result of reduced costs, would gain annually by Rs. 346.88 million, and 
larger farmers would contribute more towards costs by Rs. 529.76 million, and overall revenue 
would increase significantly by 21.8 percent. With policy option – 3,   Rs. 876 million would be 
re-distributed with significant part in favor of poor small landholders in Punjab. 
For Pakistan as a whole, option – 2 (flat rate charge at the present average rate) would 
result in annual gains for small farmers through reduced costs by Rs. 130.06 million, and cost to 
larger farmers would increase by Rs. 605.97 million, and annual total revenues will increase by 
5.6 percent. Under option – 3, smaller farmers, as a result of reduced costs, would gain by Rs. 
519.65 million, and larger farmers would contribute more towards costs by Rs. 842.45 million, 
and overall revenue would increase significantly by 22.7 percent. With policy option – 3,   over 
Rs. 1362 million would be re-distributed with significant part in favor of poor small landholders 
in Pakistan. Option – 3 is better than both options – 1 & 2 from revenue and equity perspectives. 
Option – 2 is relatively equitable, option – 3 is pro-poor, as per ha irrigation charge to the poor 19 
would be less than that to the non-poor, and would be significantly less than that for options – 1 
& 2.  
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that the existing irrigation charging policy 
in Pakistan favors larger landholders, and disfavors poor small farmers. Policy options 2, and 
particularly option 3 would result in redistribution of significant amount of funds each year, with 
significant amount in favor of poor small farmers. Policy change towards option 2 or 3 could be 
implemented with existing institutional arrangements in place, and as such does not involve any 
costs. Major benefits with such a policy change would include:(1) more funds available for 
O&M, with resulting improvements on O&M leading to increased efficiency in irrigation supply 
and improved system productivity; (2) benefits in terms of reduced costs to small and poor 
landholders; and more importantly, it would be a step forward to reversing existing inequities in 
water charges. What is needed is a clear understanding of the problem and strong political will to 
a policy change that improves irrigation management and is pro-poor. 
 
Table 4: Implications of Alternate Irrigation Charging Policies for Small and Large Landholders 
in Pakistan  
Punjab  Basic data 
Total number of farms up to 5 ha (Million), smaller farms  2.35 
Total number of farms above 5 ha  (Million), larger farmers  0.61 
Total number of farms- all (Million)  2.96 
Total area of farms up to 5 ha (Million ha)  4.36 
Total area of farms above 5 ha (Million ha)  6.61 
Total area of farms –All (Million ha)  10.97 
Policy Implications  Policy 





Total revenue from smaller farms (Rs. Million)   1902.36  1832.81  1824.24 
Total revenue from larger farms (Rs. Million)  2471.94  2774.67  3501.82 
Total revenue from all farms (Rs. Million)  4374.3  4607.48  5326.06 
Increase in smaller farmers income in Rs. Million (reduced total 
payments) with option -1 as base 
-  74.45  346.88 
Increase in large farmers contribution to costs in Rs. Million 
(increased total payments ) with option -1 as base 
-  326.77  529.76 
Pakistan  Basic Data 
Total number of farms up to 5 ha (Million), smaller farms  4.10 
Total number of farms above 5 ha  (Million), larger farms  0.97 
Total number of farms- all (Million)  5.07 
Total area of farms up to 5 ha (Million ha)  7.43 
Total area of farms above 5 ha (Million ha)  11.72 
Total area of farms –All (Million ha)  19.15 
Policy Implications  Policy 





Total revenue from smaller farms (Rs. Million)   3240.87  3122.09  3103.72 
Total revenue from larger farms (Rs. Million)  4374.22  4920.76  6237.13 
Total revenue from all farms (Rs. Million)  7615.09  8042.85  9340.85 
Increase in smaller farmers income in Rs. Million (reduced total 
payments) with option -1 as base 
-  130.06  519.65 
 Increase in large farmers contribution to costs in Rs. Million 
(increased total payments ) with option -1 as base 
-  605.97  842.45 
Source: calculations based on landholdings data from Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, 
Islamabad (2000-2001), and figures from analysis in the paper.  
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Have Higher Irrigation Charges and Improved Service Delivery been Advantageous 
to the Poor? 
 
It is clear from the above discussion that low level of irrigation charges and the biased charging 
structure have been disadvantageous to the poor marginal and small farmers both directly and 
indirectly. Now let us reverse the question and ask: have the higher level of irrigation charges 
applied uniformly to all farmers been advantageous to the poor small farmers?. Here the case of 
Hakra- 4R, Punjab, Pakistan, is in point. In Hakra- 4R, secondary and tertiary level management 
of the system have been transferred to farmer organization, and the systems are being managed 
through participation of farmer members and their elected representatives. Recent performance 
assessment of the system indicates that irrigation charges have been increased in the system, 
service delivery has improved, irrigation infrastructure condition and its management has also 
improved, overall performance of the systems (in terms of equity in water distribution, access to 
water by tailenders (where there is more poverty), cropped areas and cropped productivity) has 
also improved. 
As shown in  Table 5, after the transfer of management to farmer organization and 
improvement in service delivery, irrigation charges were increased, collection rate improved and 
total revenue collection increased by about Rs. 1 million. This resulted in more funds available 
for operation and maintenance of the system. Infrastructure of the distributary was improved, 
including adjustments of outlets, de-silting, strengthening of banks, and other repair work. Along 
with infrastructure management, i rrigation water management/distribution was also improved. 
These factors led to increasing water delivery performance and overall system efficiency as 
shown in Table 5. Increased overall water availability and its improved access have resulted in 
increased crop area by around 6 percent from 25614 ha to 27115 ha. More importantly, 
distribution of water improved significantly with head-tail equity ratio of around 1. Among the 
distributaries studied, equity performance of Hakra - 4R was the highest (Head-tail equity ratio 
for other distributaries studied in Punjab ranged from 1.23 to 2.50, indicating significant inequity 
in water distribution). With improved service delivery, availability, reliability and access to water 
at the tailends have improved significantly. There is empirical evidence that there is more 
incidence of poverty at tailends of Hakra-4R, and the poor farmers have benefited from this 
improvement. During farm level surveys, 43 percent of poor small farmers at the tailends 
indicated that they have benefited from the improved service delivery and resulting improved 
system performance. Overall, 63 percent of farmers showed satisfaction in terms of receiving 
their due share of water. Other benefits included reduction in water theft (as indicated by 81 
percent of the respondents), reduction in litigation cases related to irrigation water and rent 
seeking by irrigation officials.  
Similar situation was observed in Kalibawang system in Yogyakarta where management 
at the secondary and tertiary level of the system was transferred in late 1990s to the water user 21 
association. After transfer, the level of irrigation service charged increased, collection rate 
increased significantly, and overall service delivery and system performance was improved. 
 
 
   Table 5. Impacts of Improved Service Delivery in Hakra-4R, Punjab, Pakistan.  
 
Indicator  1998 (before transfer)  2002 (after transfer) 
Water charge (Rs/ha)  175  199 
Total revenue collection (Million Rs.)  4.49  5.40 
Water delivery performance*  0.91  1.04 
Overall system efficiency**  0.47  0.52 
Cropped area (ha)  25614  27115 
Head-tail equity  Not available  1.09 
Farmers Response 
-  increased benefits at the head (%) 
-  increased benefits at the middle (%) 
-  increased benefits at the tailends (%) 








*water delivery performance is defined as the ratio of actual to target volume of water delivered. 





‘Affordability and Willingness to Pay’ Issue  
 
As mentioned in the earlier part of the paper, sometimes concerns such as ‘affordability and 
willingness to pay’ of farmers are offered as justifications to keep irrigation charges at low levels. 
It is to be noted from data in Table 3 that: (a) small and poor farmers pay more in total per ha cost 
of irrigation than large and non-poor farmers, (b) in the absence of access to canal water, small 
and poor farmers make relatively greater use of groundwater (which they mostly buy), which is 
around 9 times expensive than canal water. On average, groundwater cost constitute over 20 
percent of gross value of production (GVP)  per hectare (compared to canal water that constitute 
only 2.5 percent of GVP per hectare. If small and poor farmers can afford (and are willing) to pay 
for the expensive groundwater, they can surely afford to pay for less expensive canal water 
provided they have access to canal water and overall service is satisfactory. Therefore, the 
argument of ‘affordability and willingness to pay’ is not valid. What is important in relation to 
farmers willingness to pay is the quality of service delivery.      
 
 
Revenue Collection and Spending Mechanisms 
 
While level and structure of irrigation charge is important, equally important is the collection rate 
and spending mechanisms. As shown in Table 1 earlier, irrigation charge collection rate varies 
from 5 percent to 99 percent in 26 systems studied, with lowest collection rate in Bangladeshi 
systems and the highest in Vietnam. Overall, collection rate is higher in the studied systems in 22 
Southeast Asia and China, and lower in systems in South Asia. In general, collection rate and 
overall collection efficiency is high in those systems where service delivery and overall 
performance is satisfactory, and where there are decentralized institutional arrangements for 
spending of the collected revenues (as in transferred systems in Pakistan (Hakra-4R), Indonesia 
(Kalibawang and Krogowanan), Vietnam (village level cooperatives, and Irrigation and drainage 
management companies) and in Chinese systems (village level cooperatives). Collection 
efficiency is low in those systems, where collected revenues are remitted to the treasury and the 
system maintenance and management depend on public sector budgetary allocations. Under the 
decentralized institutional arrangements for collection and spending, water users have incentives 
to pay charges as they see that the amount paid is being spent for improving system performance, 
and also there is informal social pressure on them for payment of charges. 
 
 
What Needs to be Done ? 
 
The study demonstrates that irrigation is a significant determinant of poverty alleviation, and the 
anti-poverty impacts of irrigation, depends on, in addition to other factors, on the performance of 
irrigation systems – which is influenced by the availability of funding and spending mechanisms, 
and the effectiveness of institutional arrangements and incentive structures in place. In order to 
realize the enhanced anti-poverty impacts of irrigation, there is an urgent need to improve 
performance of the systems. The study suggests that: (a) availability of funding for the sector 
needs to be increased through increase in irrigation service charges to the level that fully covers 
the cost of irrigation service, with gradual move towards market based charging for irrigation.; (b) 
irrigation management institutions needs to made more decentralized and financially autonomous 
– in terms of setting irrigation charges, charge assessment, collection and spending – to create 
incentives and strengthen financial linkages between irrigation managers, service providers and 
the users; (c) poverty concerns need to be specifically recognized in irrigation in irrigation 
charging, and overall management policies, and the poor should have an equal voice in irrigation 
management organizations. Where necessary, irrigation charging structure may be made pro-poor 
through effective implementation of discriminatory/differential  charging in favor of the poor; (d) 
irrigation charges should be linked to  service delivery; (f) irrigation service providers should be 
required to meet certain standards in relation to irrigation system performance in terms of 
maintenance of irrigation infrastructure, w ater conveyance and use efficiency, productivity, 
equity and sustainability of the systems; (g) the public sector agencies should play roles as 
regulators (providing regulator back-up, and enforcement of rules and regulations), enabler and 
facilitator for effective implementation of performance improvement measures.   
For all this to  materialize, building effective partnerships among service providers, 
governments, communities, research and development organizations and donors are important. 23 
Each one of these partners has its own comparative advantage. Figure 4 highlights some of the 
key areas where each partners can make contribution, with the objective of improving irrigation 
performance for immediate enhanced anti-poverty impacts of irrigation. For more details on the 
specific productivity enhancing pro-poor interventions, see Hussain and Hanjra (2003).  
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Summary, Conclusions and Implications 
 
This paper examines the i mplications of irrigation service charge policies for the poor in 
developing Asian countries. The basic question answered in the paper is ‘Have low irrigation 
service charges disadvantaged the poor?’. The paper also demonstrates the implications of 
alternate structures of water charges for the poor. The empirical evidence presented in the paper is 
mainly based on primary data collected through household level surveys from 5408 households in 
26 medium and large scale irrigation systems in six countries: Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam. The paper first establishes that irrigation contributes to poverty 
alleviation, and the anti-poverty impacts of irrigation vary across and within irrigation systems, 
and depend on a number of factors. Some of these factors relate to irrigation service delivery and 
irrigation management performance, and others relate to pattern of land distribution and access to 
non-water inputs and support measures. Further, the paper suggests that the poor irrigation 
performance reduces the benefits of irrigation and negates the anti-poverty impacts of irrigation. 
Poor service delivery in irrigation causes poor performance, and both are outcomes of lack of 
appropriate and effective institutional arrangements and incentive structures, and most 
importantly, inadequate funding and lower than the required spending in the sector resulting from 
low cost recovery and low level of irrigation charges. It is suggested that the poor service delivery 
and the low level of irrigation charges creates vicious circle of the poor irrigation performance, 
reducing anti-poverty impacts of irrigation. 
In the studied systems, irrigation charge varies from US$ 1 to US$ 67 per ha, 
representing 0.2 to 7.5 percent of gross value of production per hectare, and the collection rate 
varies from 5 percent to 99 percent. In general irrigation charge level and the collection rate is 
lower in the studied systems in South Asian countries than those in China, Indonesia and 
Vietnam. The low level of charge, especially in agency managed systems in South Asian 
countries neither not reflects the value of water nor the full cost of supplying water. In these 
systems, the level of charge is too low to have any influence on the behavior of water users and 
the overall efficiency of water use.  
In general, where irrigation charge level is higher, irrigation service delivery and 
performance of the systems is better, productivity level is relatively higher and poverty incidence 
is low, and vice versa. Overall system performance is better in the transferred systems compared 
to those of agency managed. In the South Asian agency managed systems, irrigation charging, 
collection and spending mechanisms are highly centralized and irrigation charges are not linked 
to the service delivery. Where there are decentralized institutional arrangements for irrigation 
management through involvement of farmer/user organization, and there is an element of 
financial autonomy, irrigation charges tend to be linked to irrigation service, charge collection 
and revenue spending are more decentralized and relatively efficient and overall performance is 
better than the agency managed centralized systems. Overall the findings indicate that in settings, 25 
where appropriate institutional arrangements are in place, incentive structures have been built in 
management of irrigation, irrigation charges have been increased, service delivery and system 
performance has improved, the poor have benefited in a significant way.  
The study findings indicate that in settings where landholdings are inequitably 
distributed, not only the level of irrigation charge is important, the structure of the charge has 
strong implications for the poor. Empirical evidence from irrigation systems in Pakistan, which 
are characterized by high level of inequity in land and water distribution, suggests that poor small 
farmers pay more in total per ha cost of irrigation than large non-poor farmers. In this situation, 
any attempt to raise irrigation charges would harm the poor farmers more than the non-poor 
farmers. The study analyzes the implications of three policy scenarios for the poor: present 
charging policy, flat rate policy and differential rate policy, and suggests that the present charging 
policy is pro-large farmers, flat rate policy would be more equitable and differential rate policy 
would be pro-poor.  The analysis indicates that differential rate policy, as suggested in the paper, 
would result in revenue increases by 27.7 percent, and this option would result in annual re-
distribution of Rs 1362 million, with significant amount redistributed in favor of the poor small 
farmers – a win-win situation in terms of cost recovery and benefits to the poor.  
In sum, the study findings imply that low level of charges applied uniformly to all socio-
economic groups of farmers is disadvantageous to the poor, as it adversely affects the system 
performance (low irrigation charge in this context is just like giving sugar to a diabetic patient). 
In settings where land and water distribution is highly inequitable, differential -charging systems 
may be introduced to directly benefit the poorest of the poor. Based on the analysis and the 
evidence presented, the study suggests there is a need to increase irrigation charges to the level 
that is adequate to cover the required costs for improving system performance. Revenue 
collection and spending mechanisms also needs to be improved.  This would require appropriate 
and effective institutional arrangements, and incentive structures in overall management of 
irrigation systems. The key messages of this paper is that: (a) access to water makes a difference 
in terms of benefits to the poor; and (b) improved system performance and service delivery 
improves access to water; (c) system performance and service delivery improves when spending 
increases through increased payment for service from farmers, (d) the problems of poor service 
delivery and low irrigation charges needs to be addressed simultaneously. Irrigation water or the 
related service is no longer free or cheap, and when it is made free or cheap:  a) it rarely 
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